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ABSTRACT
My goal here is twofold. First, I want to introduce the theory of
strategic action fields to the law audience. The main idea in field
theory in sociology is that most social action occurs in social arenas
where actors know one another and take one another into account in
their action. Scholars use the field construct to make sense of how
and why social orders emerge, reproduce, and transform. Underlying
this formulation is the idea that a field is an ongoing game where
actors have to understand what others are doing in order to frame
their actions. Second, I want to argue that there is a great deal of
theoretical leverage to be gained by considering law as a field. To
make all of this more concrete, I use field theory to offer a stylized
account of the rise of the “shareholder value” movement of the 1980s
and the use of agency theory as the dominant theory of corporate
governance to justify the shareholder value revolt. I end by considering whether or not field theory has normative implications useful for
the law.
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INTRODUCTION
The main idea of field theory in sociology is that most social action occurs in social arenas where actors know one another and take
one another into account in their action.1 Fields imply that something
is at stake and can be won or lost. Fields also imply a stable order,
one that allows for the reproduction of the actors and their positions
over time. This general formulation of field theory is sometimes described as a meso-level social order.
The term “meso” refers to the fact that actors are taking each
other into account in framing actions. This does not mean that all
actors are individuals. Field theory conceives of actors as including
individuals, groups, subunits of organizations, organizations, firms,
professions, and states. Examples of meso-level social orders that
include both individual and collective actors include groups of
individuals who work in an office who cooperate over a task,
subunits of organizations that vie for organizational resources, firms
that compete with one another to dominate a market, and states that
come together to negotiate treaties. An important insight that field
theory yields is that fields are situated within other fields and affect
one another across their boundaries. Consider the relationships between individuals in an office, the office situated in a division of a
corporation, and the corporation situated in a broader field of competitors.
Scholars use the field construct to make sense of how and why
social orders emerge, reproduce, and transform. Underlying this formulation is the idea that a field is an ongoing game where actors
have to understand what others are doing in order to frame their actions. This idea caused field theorists to consider issues of agency
and action. They have pursued sociological views of how cognition
1 . See generally P IERRE B OURDIEU & LOÏC J. D. W ACQUANT , A N I NVITATION TO
R EFLEXIVE S OCIOLOGY (1992); N EIL F LIGSTEIN & DOUG M CADAM , A THEORY OF F IELDS
(2012); John Levi Martin, What is Field Theory?, 109 AM . J. S OC. 1 (2003).
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works, focusing on issues of culture, framing, meaning, identity,
habit, and socialization. While the role of actors in field theory varies
somewhat across different versions of the theory, field theories explicitly reject rational actor models and instead rely on phenomenology and symbolic interaction as models of actors to understand what
actors do under varying field conditions.
Given this flexibility and abstractness, these ideas have profitably been applied to a wide variety of settings, including social
movements, 2 state building,3 state–society relations,4 culture and lifestyle, 5 the construction of cultural fields, 6 and various aspects of
firms and markets.7
My goal here is twofold. First, I will introduce the theory of
strategic action fields to the legal audience. I will then argue that
there is a great deal of theoretical leverage to be gained by consider-

2 . See generally C HRISTOPHER K. A NSELL , S CHISM AND S OLIDARITY IN S OCIAL
MOVEMENTS: THE P OLITICS OF L ABOR IN THE F RENCH THIRD R EPUBLIC (1st ed. 2001); DOUG
MC ADAM , P OLITICAL P ROCESS AND THE D EVELOPMENT OF B LACK INSURGENCY , 1930–1970
(2d ed. 1999); DEBRA C. M INKOFF , O RGANIZING FOR E QUALITY : T HE EVOLUTION OF
WOMEN ’ S AND R ACIAL -ETHNIC O RGANIZATIONS IN AMERICA , 1955–1985 (1995); Elizabeth.
S. Clemens, Organizational Form as Frame: Collective Identity and Political Strategy in the
American Labor Movement, 1880–1920, in C OMPARATIVE P ERSPECTIVES ON S OCIAL
MOVEMENTS: P OLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES , MOBILIZING S TRUCTURES, AND C ULTURAL
F RAMING 205 (Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald eds., 1996).
3. See generally HENDRIK S PRUYT , THE S OVEREIGN S TATE AND ITS C OMPETITORS : AN
ANALYSIS OF S YSTEMS C HANGE (1996).
4. See generally F RANK DOBBIN , F ORGING I NDUSTRIAL P OLICY : THE U NITED S TATES ,
B RITAIN , AND F RANCE IN THE R AILWAY AGE (1994); V ARIETIES OF C APITALISM (Peter A.
Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001); Pierre Bourdieu et al., Rethinking the State: Genesis and
Structure of the Bureaucratic Field, 12 S OC. THEORY 1 (1994); Peter Hall, The Movement
from Keynesianism to Monetarism: Institutional Analysis and British Economic Policy in the
1970s, in S TRUCTURING P OLITICS : HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN C OMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 90 (Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen & Frank Longstreth eds., 1992).
5 . See generally P IERRE B OURDIEU , DISTINCTIONS : A S OCIAL C RITIQUE OF THE
J UDGEMENT OF T ASTE (Richard Nice trans., 1984).
6. See Pierre Bourdieu et al., supra note 4.
7 . See generally NEIL F LIGSTEIN , THE A RCHITECTURE OF M ARKETS: AN ECONOMIC
S OCIOLOGY OF T WENTY-F IRST -C ENTURY C APITALIST S OCIETIES (2001) [hereinafter
F LIGSTEIN , ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS ]; N EIL F LIGSTEIN , T HE T RANSFORMATION OF
C ORPORATE C ONTROL (1990) [hereinafter F LIGSTEIN , C ORPORATE C ONTROL ]; MICHAEL
USEEM , EXECUTIVE DEFENSE : S HAREHOLDER P OWER AND C ORPORATE R EORGANIZATION
(1993); Gerald F. Davis, Kristina A. Diekmann & Catherine H. Tinsley, The Decline and Fall
of the Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational
Form, 59 A M. S OC. R EV . 547 (1994); Neil Fligstein, Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural
Approach to Market Institutions, 61 AM. S OC. R EV . 656 (1996) [hereinafter Fligstein, Markets as Politics]; Paul Ingram & Hayagreeva Rao, Store Wars: The Enactment and Repeal of
Anti-Chain-Store Legislation in America, 110 A M. J. S OC . 446 (2004).
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ing law as a field.8 The courts, legal professionals, law schools, various organizations of legal subfields, and constituencies that hire lawyers, particularly corporations, can be studied as a set of fields that
have histories, dominant groups, dominant ideas, and trajectories.
Law is a force that is used to structure field relations outside of
the legal arena. Indeed, the linkage between state and market is frequently mediated through law.9 To the degree that dominant groups
are given privileged access to the legal and regulatory system, or
their practices are codified and enforced as law, dominant groups
maintain their positions of power. Scholars accept that regulatory and
cognitive capture occurs routinely.10 Additionally, scholars agree that
corporations, more or less, get their way in the construction and implementation of law.11
What is perhaps more interesting is the process by which some
groups successfully challenge the incumbents in a given field or
market, reorganize that field or market, and then capture the law and
regulators in their favor. To make all of this more concrete, I use
field theory to offer a stylized account of the rise of the “shareholder
value” movement of the 1980s and the use of agency theory as the
dominant theory of corporate governance to justify the shareholder
revolt.
At the core of the literature on corporate governance is the
agency theory model in economics.12 This model views the corporate
governance problem as an issue of how owners of joint-stock corporations control managers and ensure they work in the corporation’s
8 . See, e.g., YVES D EZALAY & B RYANT G. GARTH , DEALING IN VIRTUE : I NTERN C OMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE C ONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER (1996); YVES DEZALAY & B RYANT G. GARTH , THE I NTERNATIONALIZATION OF
P ALACE WARS: LAWYERS , ECONOMISTS , AND THE C ONTEST TO TRANSFORM L ATIN
AMERICAN S TATES (2002); Stephanie Lee Mudge & Antoine Vauchez, Building Europe on a
Weak Field: Law, Economics, and Scholarly Avatars in Transnational Politics, 118 A M. J.
S OC . 449 (2012).
9. The classic works in the history of law were all concerned with thinking how law was
at the center of the relationship between business and the government. For a variety of perspectives, see L AWRENCE M. F RIEDMAN , A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 2005);
MORTON J. H ORWITZ , THE T RANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW , 1870–1960 (1977); and
J AMES WILLARD HURST , T HE LEGITIMACY OF THE B USINESS C ORPORATION IN THE L AW OF
THE U NITED S TATES , 1780–1970 (2010).
10. See P REVENTING R EGULATORY C APTURE : S PECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW
TO L IMIT I T 71–98 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013).
11. See Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen & Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity
of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 A M. J. S OC. 406, 407
(1999).
12. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. F IN . ECON . 305 (1976).
ATIONAL
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interests. It views the production of shareholder value, usually defined as raising the share price, as the central purpose of a publicly
held corporation. This is done through the creation of a set of institutional arrangements that provide carrots and sticks to managers in
order to get them to perform. The main problem that economists,
political scientists, and business scholars see is that these institutions
fail to constrain managers. Because boards of directors do not perform their fiduciary oversight, managers take on too much risk because their time horizons are short. Managers also work to exploit
boards of directors and increase their pay substantially. But here,
agency theory proposes that the market for corporate control provides a backstop, such that poorly performing managers and weak
boards of directors will be faced with a hostile takeover if they fail to
maximize shareholder value.13
Now, field theory’s problem with the agency theory approach is
that it fails to consider how these ideas were historical creation borne
out of field dynamics. Roe shows how the entire agency theory story
is an inaccurate historical account of how the relationship between
financial markets and publicly held corporations emerged in the
United States in the 1930s–1950s.14 In order to understand why the
shareholder value revolution developed, we need to understand who
the agents were that propagated these ideas in order to gain advantage and justify their actions.
The central field where corporate governance is at stake is the
market for corporate control where the ultimate corporate power—
the ability to own and control corporations—is enacted. The extant
literature argues that managers dominated corporate governance before 1980, as they decided who was going to be a target for mergers
and acquisitions. 15 But the economic downturn of the 1970s undermined managerial dominance; managers failed to deliver growth,
profits, or stock price increases. As a result, outside challengers,
principally different kinds of institutional investors who used the
capital markets to raise funds to upset sitting management teams and
reorganize corporations, invaded the market for corporate control.16
This invasion shifted those in control of the field of corporate control
13. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26
J.L. & ECON . 301, 313–18 (1983).
14. See generally MARK J. R OE , S TRONG MANAGERS , W EAK O WNERS: THE P OLITICAL
R OOTS OF A MERICAN C ORPORATE F INANCE (1994).
15. See U SEEM , supra note 7.
16. See F LIGSTEIN , ARCHITECTURE OF M ARKETS, supra note 7, at 147–66.
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from managers to institutional investors. 17 Accompanying this restructuring was shareholder value discourse that justified the takeover of the field. The agency-theory-inspired discourse of shareholder
value privileged shareholders over other actors, embedding the view
in corporate law.
Field theory proves useful to explain when challengers might be
successful and, once in place, how they maintain power. It provides
us with less of a theory of what “ought” to be and more of an account
of what happened. This Article ends by considering whether field
theory has normative implications.
I. A THEORY OF STRATEGIC ACTION FIELDS
The core insight of field theory is that fields are socially constructed arenas within which individuals or groups with differing
resource endowments vie for advantage. 18 For groups to succeed,
they must engage in strategic social action, by which I mean undertake actions that take into account what others are doing. The model
of action that we wish to propose here is one that focuses on social
skill: the ability to engage cooperatively with others.19 I use the term
strategic action field (SAF) in order to highlight both the structuring
of the field and the role of actors in the production and transformation of the field.20
Fields are embedded in other fields like a Russian doll. A firm
may contain product divisions each locked in competition with divisions from other firms; the divisions themselves may fight out for
others’ resources with each other in the larger firm, and the larger
firm is embedded in a world of financiers, suppliers, customers, and
regulators. Each of these might constitute a field for analysts to
study. This view of SAFs implies that the possibility for collective
strategic action in modern societies is virtually endless, and the number of such fields may be impossible to estimate.
It is necessary to specify what kinds of problems need to be
solved in order for a stable social space, an SAF, to come into existence. 21 In an unorganized social space, everything is up for grabs:
17. See id.
18. See B OURDIEU & WACQUANT , supra note 1, at 94–115; F LIGSTEIN & M CA DAM ,
supra note 1, at 8–23; Martin, supra note 1, at 1–5.
19. See generally Neil Fligstein, Social Skill and Institutional Theory, 40 A M. B EHAV .
S CIENTIST 397 (1997).
20. This discussion summarizes F LIGSTEIN & MC ADAM , supra note 1.
21. Id. at 8–23.
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what the purpose of the field is, what positions exist, who occupies
which position, what the rules of the game are, and how actors come
to understand what other actors are doing. A stable SAF solves these
problems, as fields are governed by formal and informal rules. Rules
are a collectively shared cognitive construct used to control interactions between organizations or groups in an SAF. The nature of these
rules is to give actors an intersubjective view of what other actors
mean by their actions. Once in place, the rules comprise the template
for constructing and interpreting subsequent actions.
The purpose of fashioning a shared template is, first and foremost, to ensure sufficient stability to allow action to take place.
However, the rules and definitions that emerge define and promote
the interests and advantages of already existing organizations or
groups. This is achieved by articulating rules by which actions between more and less powerful members can be made more predictable, less threatening, and more rewarding to all. Hence, all forms of
strategic action oriented towards the creation and maintenance of
rules are by nature political, in that they involve both contestation
and alliances.
One can usefully distinguish between incumbents and challengers in any given SAF. Incumbents are powerful organizations or
groups with the necessary political or material resources to enforce
an advantageous view of appropriate field behavior and definition of
field membership on other groups. Challengers are organizations or
groups which define themselves as members of a given SAF, but
generally accept the given social order and the advantages it gives
incumbents, either because they fear retribution by incumbents or
because they see little chance of altering the order in the short run.
There are two main tactics toward solving the general conflict
in SAFs: the imposition of a hierarchical power relationship between
actors or the creation of a political coalition based on cooperation.
Hierarchy implies a pecking order of groups that can be distinguished
as incumbents and challengers. The incumbents are generally the
largest groups that predominantly define the situation and get most of
the valued objects in the SAF. 22 The challengers are the smaller
groups who may not totally accept their place in the SAF but are
generally unable to contest it. The hierarchy of incumbents and challengers is held in place by coercion or competitive threat. If incumbents have overwhelming resources, including the threat of force,
22. Indeed, that is why we think of them as incumbents!
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they can coerce challengers and keep them in line by using material
and psychic threats.
A political coalition reflects an alliance between two or more
groups. Cooperation may be based on common identity or interests.
A political coalition that organizes an SAF can contain explicit
agreements between groups on the nature of the SAF and how the
gains and losses will be distributed between groups. Often, groups in
a political coalition will come to share a common identity, even if
they did not have one before. This identity defines who is a member
of the coalition and who is not.
In reality, hierarchies are not just held in place by coercive or
competitive advantage, and political coalitions do not rely entirely on
cooperation. Hierarchies often depend on the tacit consent of challengers and can even provide some rewards for compliance with a
hierarchical order. So, incumbents will keep the lion’s share of resources to themselves, but will allow challengers to survive. In return, challengers will keep their opposition to incumbents in check.
Political coalitions continue to experience conflict and competition
on an ongoing basis. Groups in the coalition will believe that they are
not getting their fair share of rewards or that their vision of the coalition is not being honored. They can try to remake the coalition by
getting a different configuration of groups and goals recognized.
II. STRATEGIC ACTION AND SOCIAL SKILL
Strategic action is the attempt by social actors to create and
maintain stable social worlds by securing the cooperation of others.23
In order to engage in strategic action, people have to exercise social
skill. Social skill is defined as the ability of actors to induce cooperation in other actors in order to produce, contest, or reproduce an order.24 Social skill is based in symbolic interaction, a theory that emphasizes both the symbolic and social nature of interaction.25 At the
core of social skill is the ability to imaginatively identify with the
mental states of others in order to find collective meanings that motivate others. Social skill entails utilizing a set of methods to induce
cooperation from one’s own group and other groups.26 Skilled social
23. See Fligstein, supra note 19, at 398.
24. Id. at 397–99.
25. For the original explication of this theory, see generally G EORGE HERBERT M EAD ,
MIND , S ELF, AND S OCIETY (1934).
26. Neil Fligstein, Social Skill and the Theory of Fields, 19 S OC . THEORY 105, 105–10
(2001).
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actors interpret the actions of others in the field and, on the basis of
the position of their group, use their perception of current opportunities or constraints to attain cooperation.
The definition of social skill highlights how certain individuals
possess a highly developed cognitive capacity for reading people and
environments, framing lines of action, and mobilizing people in the
service of these action “frames.” 27 These frames frequently involve
understandings that are open to interpretation, offering other actors
identities and resonating with varying groups. Discovering and propagating these frames is a social skill that underscores the “cultural”
or “constructed” dimension of social action.
In stable social worlds, skilled strategic actors help to produce
and reproduce a status quo.28 They are aided by a collective set of
meanings shared by other actors in which those actors’ identities and
interests are defined. It is also the case that in “institutionalized”
social worlds, meanings are “taken for granted” and actions are
readily framed against those meanings. In unorganized social space,
the task for skilled strategic actors is somewhat different. Skilled
actors can become “institutional entrepreneurs.”29 In those situations,
their ability to help create and maintain collective identities comes to
the fore and is at the greatest premium.
By emphasizing the cognitive, empathetic, and communicative
dimensions of social skill, I hope to underscore that actors who undertake strategic action must be able to use whatever perspective
they have developed in a sufficiently intersubjective fashion to secure the willing cooperation of others. This kind of skill requires that
actors have the ability to transcend their own individual and group’s
narrow self-interest and formulate the problem of the multiple group
interest, thereby able to mobilize sufficient support for a certain
shared worldview. 30
A. The Emergence of SAFs
It is useful to consider more systematically how skilled social
actors, strategic action, and the relative resources of groups produce
27. Id. at 108–12; see also David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization, 1 INT ’L S OC. MOVEMENT R ES. 197 (1988).
28. See William H. Sewell, Jr., A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation, 98 AM . J. S OC . 1 (1992).
29 . Paul DiMaggio, Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory, in INSTITUTIONAL
P ATTERNS AND O RGANIZATION : C ULTURE AND E NVIRONMENT 3, 3–21 (Lynne G. Zucker ed.,
1988).
30. M EAD , supra note 25, at 322–26.
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either hierarchically organized SAFs or cooperative SAFs. Action in
an emergent SAF is often best thought of as akin to a social movement. This is because in unorganized social space, the purpose of the
field, the positions that exist, who occupies which position, the rules of the
game, and how actors come to understand what other actors are doing are
not established. Groups will come into a social space where there is an
opportunity to offer alternative cultural framings for how to organize
that space, just as social movement groups do when there is a political opportunity. New social spaces are political opportunities. Because the social space is fluid, there exists the possibility for new
political coalitions of groups and new social forms of interaction.
It is useful to understand where such opportunities are generated. New SAFs are likely to emerge in nearby existing ones. They are
also likely to be populated by, or offshoots of, existing groups. Indeed, to the degree that societies become increasingly organized, the
opportunities for forming new fields are increasing because unorganized fields are spawned by empty spaces created between organized fields, including those fields and the state. For instance, once
the dominant biological model of disease won out over its rivals, the
medical profession and its specialties developed.31 In the case of the
economy, “new” product markets are often founded near to “old”
product markets as part and parcel of the search to attain stability for
the firm. 32 Existing SAFs provide opportunities for new SAFs because they provide the “market” for new ends to emerge.
In modern society, new SAFs often result from state action. For
example, as soon as a law is set in place, organizations or groups can
move in to take advantage of the new opportunities the law creates
for strategic action. Similarly, organized groups can take their grievances to the state in an attempt to help produce rules to stabilize their
SAFs. States can also intentionally or unintentionally undermine
stable SAFs through direct and indirect actions.33
31 . See P AUL S TARR, T HE S OCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF A MERICAN M EDICINE : THE
R ISE OF A S OVEREIGN P ROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY (1982).
32. See H ARRISON C. W HITE , MARKETS FROM NETWORKS: S OCIOECONOMIC M ODELS OF
P RODUCTION 266–84 (2d ed. 2004).
33. So, for example, antitrust law has been used effectively to undermine the order of
markets by forcing incumbent firms to change their behavior. This takes away the advantage
of the dominant firm and can force a reorganization of the market. There can also be unintended consequences from state actions that undermine particular fields. FLIGSTEIN ,
C ORPORATE C ONTROL , supra note 7, at 123–46. The federal government’s legislative responses to the civil rights movement had the unintended consequence of reorganizing the
basis of political parties in the United States. The basis of the Democratic Party before the
1960s was a coalition between white southerners and elements of the northern working class.
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Furthermore, emergent fields require new cultural tools to make
sense of what is going on. Emergent fields are the locations in society where one expects to see the most innovative forms of action precisely because more possibilities exist to define the situation. These
frames can be borrowed from actors in a nearby social space. They
can also reflect the unique political compromise by which field stability has been achieved. One could go so far as to argue that almost
all of the real opportunities to innovate in SAFs occur at their formation. One reason change seems so endemic to modern society is
that the extension of social organization has the effect of creating
more unfilled spaces.
Emergent fields also represent situations in which particularly
skilled strategic actors, who are able to consider interests outside of
their own, can make an enormous difference by helping to fashion a
collective identity that speaks to the interests of many prospective
field members.34 Indeed, while material resources remain a powerful
weapon in the struggle to shape the broad cultural contours of the
emerging field, it is quite possible at this stage for a coalition of relatively impoverished groups to band together under the tutelage of
skilled strategic actors to overcome better-endowed groups. Successful field projects produce cultural elements that can be borrowed by
actors in adjacent social spaces.35
B. Stability in SAFs
One can say an SAF is stable when the stakes are well understood, the incumbents and challengers are defined, and the rules of
the game are known. But, “[i]n stable SAFs, constant adjustments are
being made.”36 The most common form of change occurs when individual incumbents or challengers leave the SAF or take up a different
position vis-à-vis the others. Similarly, “[a] system of ‘rules’ may be
After the Democrats supported civil rights legislation, whites in the South migrated towards
the Republican Party to form a new political coalition. See DOUG M CADAM & KARINA
KLOOS, DEEPLY DIVIDED : R ACIAL P OLITICS AND S OCIAL MOVEMENTS IN P OST -WAR
AMERICA 3–29 (2014).
34. See A NSELL , supra note 2, at 1–16.
35. The civil rights movement provided a set of techniques and cultural templates for
organizing action and a collective identity that subsequent groups adopted. Doug McAdam
shows that many of the people who participated in the civil rights movement ended up being
important in the women’s liberation movement that followed. They explicitly borrowed from
the civil rights movement and applied it to a new field. DOUG MCA DAM , F REEDOM S UMMER
199–232 (1988).
36 . Neil Fligstein, Understanding Stability and Change in Fields, 33 R ES.
ORGANIZATIONAL B EHAV . 39, 45 (2013).
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agreed upon by both incumbents and challengers, but adherence to
those rules is always more or less.” 37 Common understandings can
themselves become altered, suggesting that these rules can be in
some form of flux and negotiation. The ongoing field process is thus
a game that is constantly being played. This means that some rule
breaking and conflict will characterize stable SAFs. This will result
in constant system adjustments and testing whereby tactics might
change, but the overall nature of the field remains intact.
Incumbents will always work to protect their positions by using
the advantages built into the fields. But as those advantages are undermined by new tactics on the part of challengers or coalition partners, incumbents will assert their power. Typically, this means trying
to defend the existing order by using whatever methods they have.
This is business as usual in stable SAFs. So, while some level of
conflict and change is ubiquitous in fields, SAFs are constantly making accommodations to conditions within and across SAFs, all the
while preserving the power of incumbents. This suggests that the
steady state of a field is always somewhat chaotic and contains conflict which, in turn, can make it difficult to assess just how close to
crisis an SAF actually is.
C. What Causes the Transformation of a Stable Field?
There may well be instances where a crisis develops in a field
as a result of gradual, corrosive processes internal to the SAF. Challenger groups that are learning and adapting may undermine the incumbents’ ability to defend how the field is structured and who gets
what rewards.38 Most frequently, such innovation on the part of challengers is met by strategic actors in incumbent groups who work to
maintain their privileges by figuring out ways to accommodate, coerce, or co-opt challengers.
Most scholars have argued that the opportunity to really transform a field will be the unintended consequence of exogenous shocks
to the field. Most of the interesting stories we have about institutional change in SAFs start with an externally induced crisis.39 Existing
SAFs are often experiencing some form of turbulence often caused
by their relationships to other SAFs. This produces piecemeal ad37. Id.
38. Id. at 45–46.
39. For a review of the literature, see Marc Schneiberg & Elisabeth S. Clemens, The
Typical Tools for the Job: Research Strategies in Institutional Analysis, 24 S OC. T HEORY 195
(2006).
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justments that do not undermine the power of a particular set of incumbents, but might operate to make their ability to control the SAF
more problematic in the long run. So, for example, incumbents may
have to make incremental concessions to challengers that undermine
their positions in the long run. This may make the SAF more open to
crisis and hence reorganization or invasion.
Real crisis will be indexed by the failure of incumbents to reproduce their position. This relatively precise definition allows the
analyst to recognize that it is the breakdown of the delivery of goods
to the incumbent that creates the most significant problems for an
SAF. This will be accompanied by a breakdown in the shared consensus on which SAFs depend. In these moments there is the possibility for momentous change. If the challengers engage in successful
strategic action, a new social order can be produced. Since all fields
are connected to other fields, and since some fields are always in
crisis, it is in the connections between fields that we are likely to
produce the possibility for change. Such sources of change will always be reverberating somewhere in a set of SAFs and, therefore, the
exogenous shock perspective only means that the social world is constantly full of possibilities for transformation.
Crisis in nearby SAFs is the most frequent cause of significant
episodes of contention within fields. This is most often the case
where resource dependencies exist. If one SAF is dependent on another for either the production of input or the consumption of output,
then crisis in the other field will produce crisis in a given SAF. This
creates a kind of vertical ripple effect across SAFs. Such crises can
undermine the very logic of a field, thereby creating opportunities for
either incumbents or challengers to dramatically change what is at
stake, who is a winner and loser, and how the new game is
understood.
One of the most important sources of change is when other
groups or organizations invade. This relatively common form of field
transformation takes one of two forms: the new groups could just be
trying to assume a position of dominance in the SAF but maintain the
basic cultural rules regarding the division of power and resources, or
the new groups could actually be trying to set up the field on entirely
new terms, restructuring what is at stake, positions and relationships,
and understandings. The latter is probably more common than the
former because gaining dominance in the SAF requires a new view
as to how the SAF should be organized. The invading groups may try
and make alliances with members of the old incumbent groups or
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else some of the challengers, on the basis of a new view of reapportionment of resources and conception of the SAF.
The basic imagery, then, is of a society consisting of millions of
SAFs linked by various types of relations. Virtually all SAFs are
connected to the state, either directly or indirectly. SAFs are thought
to be closer together when their conceptions of control rely on nearby
SAFs for rules or resources. SAFs are farther apart when there are no
obvious vertical or horizontal links. A large number of SAFs in modern societies will always be in some form of crisis and this will in
turn place other SAFs at risk. Further, invaders or the state can pose
risks to established SAFs. Those with dominant positions in SAFs
will respond to crisis by trying to make small adjustments. They will
be very unlikely to initially undertake large-scale change for two
reasons: first, they will not be able to conceptualize what that change
should look like; and second, their first response to crisis will reflect
their commitment to the existing order from which they benefit.
D. The Role of Strategic Action in Crisis
In a crisis, incumbents will initially stick to what got them
there. This is partially because they are limited by their understanding of how things work. But it is also because their power over resources and their ability to deliver goods depends on that understanding. A second option incumbents will use is to call upon the government in a crisis. If they cannot enforce their view, then getting the
government to recognize their difficulties in order to preserve the
stability of their SAF is a good tactic. In market economies, some
economists see states as distorting markets when they intervene to
protect or help some set of incumbent firms. 40 What they miss, however, is that the key dynamic of SAFs suggests that before such dominant firms will succumb, they will appeal to the state, precisely because the state has already conferred legitimacy on the essential
structure and logic of the field. This is natural because the state is a
participant in virtually all fields and has a stake in their stability to
bolster its own legitimacy. If too many fields go under, the state loses its control over its own SAFs (after all, they have to be the final
guarantee of stability) and therefore creates a regime crisis. So, it is

40. George Stigler is one of the principal founders of this perspective in economics. See
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 B ELL J. ECON . & MGMT . S CI . 3
(1971).
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axiomatic that an SAF in crisis will eventually have its incumbents
appeal to the state.
The crisis of an already existing SAF creates political opportunities for challengers to engage in strategic action. As the existing
SAF falls apart, the situation looks more and more like the emergence of new SAFs. As an order breaks down, challengers must create a larger collective identity that encompasses themselves and others. At the moment of flux, if challengers do not recognize that and
forge a collective identity with other members of the SAF, then the
political opportunity will be lost. If they stick to the collective identity that has made them successful challengers, then they are probably
going to get swept away.
In short, some group or set of individuals must propose to others a way to reorganize the SAF. If they fail to do so, the SAF may
simply collapse and become unorganized social space. Thus, the disruption of an SAF does not always result in the construction of a new
one. Challengers can opt for several alternative solutions to coalition
building around new collective identities. In particular, they may exit
the field and migrate to other fields or unorganized social space
where they will try and set up new social arrangements. The advantage to this is that they may not have to dilute their collective
identity. The disadvantage is they might fail and risk the group disbanding. They can also work to partition the already existing SAF
into several SAFs. This can be done by enlisting those who are most
sympathetic and thus also avoid diluting the collective identity of the
actors in the field.
Challengers may go about setting up the new SAF in a variety
of ways. Successful challengers will orient themselves towards the
reorganization of the social space by creating a new collective identity and bringing others along. Challengers have the best chance when
there are fewer challengers with complementary resources, and
where one group is significantly bigger than the others. If challenger
groups are able to communicate and draw on complementary resources, they may successfully find a collective identity. If one of the
challenger groups is a lot larger than the others and is able to bring
off a coalition of the others, then the chances of reorganization are
enhanced. Challengers frequently enlist the state to support whatever
direction they pursue. A failure to find a new order may result in a
field drifting in an unorganized state or even the reemergence of incumbents to restore the old order.
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III. APPLYING THE THEORY OF SAFS TO THE FIELD OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
Any reader who has made it this far is probably wondering why
the use of such an abstract theory as field theory. The abstract nature
of the approach is actually one of its greatest strengths. Field theory
is a conceptual framework that is quite useful in understanding how
real social change occurs. It situates these changes in history, in real
social arenas that shape interaction, and in the identities and interests
of individual and collective actors. This kind of conceptual apparatus
is useful to organize how we think about important changes in business and government and the role law plays in such changes. In this
Part, I show how field theory can be used to make sense of the emergence of the agency theory model of corporate governance that has
also been referred to as “shareholder value.”
Cioffi defines corporate governance as a “‘nexus of institutions’
defined by company law, financial market regulation, and labour
law.” 41 Beginning with Berle and Means, scholars have seen the
joint-stock publicly held corporation as dominated by the managers
of the largest corporations.42 This has meant that they have controlled
firms, mostly had power over workers, and organized the market for
corporate control. The law has generally provided support for this
dominance. For our purposes, the most important field was the market for corporate control. For most of the twentieth century, this
market was dominated by the managers of the publicly held corporations and not the financial community.
Mergers and acquisitions played an important role in helping
managers make profits for owners. In a previous book, I show that
managers of the largest corporations in the United States went
through several periods of change in their perspectives on how to
make money.43 Central to these changes was the use of mergers and
acquisitions. Indeed, each of the merger movements during the twentieth century can be seen as the spread of a new way in which firms
would be organized to make money. In the 1920s, managers focused
their attention on creating oligopolies by buying shares of firms within their main industries. During the Depression, managers were con41. John W. Cioffi, Governing Globalization? The State, Law, and Structural Change in
Corporate Governance, 27 J.L. & S OC ’Y 572, 574 (2000).
42 . See generally ADOLF A. B ERLE & GARDINER C. M EANS, THE M ODERN
C ORPORATION AND P RIVATE P ROPERTY (1932). For a review, see GERALD F. DAVIS ,
MANAGED BY THE M ARKETS: HOW F INANCE R E -S HAPED AMERICA 31–58 (2009).
43. F LIGSTEIN , C ORPORATE C ONTROL , supra note 7, at 1–32.
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cerned about declining business and began to be more concerned
with sales and marketing. They often used mergers and acquisitions
to diversify or fill out their product lines. This helped protect them
against downturns in any given market.
Beginning in the 1950s, managers with financial backgrounds
began to assemble conglomerates through mergers. Their key argument was that the financial markets were unable to value and manage
assets in order to make profits. Financially savvy executives claimed
they could manage disparate businesses like a financial portfolio—
they would make investments according to financial criteria and, in
doing so, would be able to maximize profit. The merger wave, which
peaked in 1967–1969, saw 40% of the Fortune 500 swallowed up in
mergers. 44
Throughout most of the century, managers claimed to have the
knowledge and information to maximize profits. Circa 1970, managers of publicly held corporations still dominated the market for corporate control. They decided who would get bought and under what
conditions. The financial markets existed for them to make such investments. From the perspective of field theory, they were the incumbents.
After the 1970s, however, American managers lost control over
the market and, thus, the largest corporations. Due to high inflation
and slow economic growth in the 1970s, profits and stock prices for
publicly held corporations fell, even as their underlying assets were
increasing in value.45 From the perspective of field theory, the economic crisis in the country was the exogenous shock that undermined
the justification for managerial dominance of the market for corporate control.
It is useful to understand how this shock played out in the world
of the financial markets. Slow economic growth meant that the major
markets of many firms stopped expanding, causing their profits to
stagnate. The inflation of the 1970s had a set of other negative effects on corporate balance sheets. Interest rates were quite high over
this period. These high rates pushed investors towards fixed income
securities like government bonds and away from stocks, causing
stock prices to drift downward over the decade. Inflation caused

44. Id. at 191–225.
45. For an overview of what happened, see DAVIS , supra note 42, at 59–101; F LIGSTEIN,
ARCHITECTURE OF M ARKETS, supra note 7, at 45–65.
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firms to have assets on their books that were increasing in value, but
from which they were not earning higher profits.46
Since many measures of firm performance were based on returns on assets or investments, firms looked even less profitable.
Foreign competition, particularly with the Japanese, heated up.
American firms lost market shares and, in some cases, entire markets
(e.g., consumer electronics). Taken together, profit margins were
squeezed by inflation, competition, and slow economic growth. Thus,
by the late 1970s, with low stock prices, undervalued assets, and
slow growth in sales and profits, many large American firms had
stock prices that valued them as being worth less than the value of
their assets and cash.47
During the economic crisis of the 1970s, the existing managerial
elite who ran large corporations were incumbents that had much at
stake in their control over the largest corporations. They explained
the poor performance of their firms to their boards of directors as a
result of the poor performance of the overall economy. This made
them unlikely candidates to produce a sweeping new order. From a
field theory perspective, most managers defended their positions by
arguing to their boards of directors that they were the people who
were best situated to ride out the economic storm. In practice, they
did not borrow money, did not revalue assets on their books that
were inflating in value, and held on to cash. Instead of taking actions
to try and alter their situation, most of them sat back and waited for
better times.
The theory of fields suggests that when existing ways of managing fail to produce economic growth or earn profits, new economic
actors emerge with a new view on how to make money. Once some
firms demonstrated the efficacy of these tactics in solving a particular crisis, the tactics frequently spread across the population of the
largest firms. The actors who pioneered these tactics often came from
outside the mainstream of business to challenge the existing order.
These pioneers had to have a critique of the existing order and a set
of strategies they would impose on firms to solve the problems.
The questions of who came up with the shareholder value conception of the firm and how they related to those who were already

46. For an in-depth analysis of these issues, see the papers in N AT ’ L B UREAU OF ECON .
R ES. P ROJECT R EPORT , C ORPORATE C APITAL S TRUCTURES IN THE U NITED S TATES (Benjamin
M. Friedman ed., 1985).
47. See id. at 113.
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running the largest corporations has been extensively studied.48 Not
surprisingly, the groups proposing analysis of the shortcomings of
sitting management teams were the ones who had the least to lose
and the most to gain by this analysis. There appears to have been a
number of important actors, including financial analysts in brokerage
houses, institutional investors like mutual funds and pension funds,
investment bankers, private equity, insurance companies, and the
newly formed executive position of chief financial officer. 49 The
financial community proposed that firms either had to voluntarily
reorganize to raise profits and stock prices or face getting bought
out.50
It is useful to explicate the idea of “maximizing shareholder
value” both as an ideology and as a set of strategies. Then, one can
connect it more directly to the various actors who promoted it. The
main idea is that the job of top managers is to insure that the assets
of the firm were returning the highest possible profits for their shareholders. This implies that no other constituency (i.e. workers, communities, or customers) should matter for the decisions that managers
undertake. Hirsch and Whitley argue that the theory has its roots in
agency theory, a branch of financial economics that evolved during
the 1970s.51 Jensen, one of the originators of agency theory, argues
that the changes that occurred during the 1980s in the market for
corporate control enhanced efficiency.52 By forcing managers to pay
more attention to shareholder interests, firms refocused their
businesses to produce higher returns.

48 . See F LIGSTEIN , ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS, supra note 7, at 147–69; USEEM ,
supra note 7, at 19–56; Dirk M. Zorn et al., Managing Investors: How Financial Markets
Reshaped the American Firm, in T HE S OCIOLOGY OF F INANCIAL MARKETS 269 (Karin Knorr
Cetina & Alex Preda eds., 2005); Gerald F. Davis & Suzanne K. Stout, Organization Theory
and the Market for Corporate Control: A Dynamic Analysis of the Characteristics of Large
Takeover Targets, 1980–1990, 37 ADMIN . S CI . Q. 605 (1992).
49. See Zorn et al., supra note 48; Dirk M. Zorn, Here a Chief, There a Chief: The Rise
of the CFO in the American Firm, 69 AM . S OC. R EV . 345 (2004).
50. See Gerald F. Davis & Tracy A. Thompson, A Social Movement Perspective on
Corporate Control, 39 ADMIN . S CI . Q. 141 (1994); Ezra W. Zuckerman, Focusing the Corporate Product: Securities Analysts and De-Diversification, 45 ADMIN . S CI . Q. 591 (2000).
51. See Paul M. Hirsch, From Ambushes to Golden Parachutes: Corporate Takeovers as
an Instance of Cultural Framing and Institutional Integration, 91 AM. J. S OC . 800 (1986);
Richard Whitley, The Transformation of Business Finance into Financial Economics: The
Roles of Academic Expansion and Changes in U.S. Capital Markets, 11 A CCT . O RGS . &
S OC ’Y 171 (1986).
52. See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, H ARV . B US. R EV ., Sept.–
Oct. 1989, at 61.
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The theory underlying shareholder value is that the relationship
between managers, boards of directors, and equity markets involves
monitoring, rewarding, and sanctioning managers to maximize the
returns on assets and, in doing so, raise the price of the stock. 53
Boards of directors monitor managers by tying their pay to performance. If boards find that these incentives do not sufficiently produce high enough profits, then boards are forced to change
management teams. If boards of directors fail to monitor managers
closely enough, the equity markets will punish firms when owners
begin to sell stock and the share price of the firm drops. This causes
the overall value of the firm (i.e., the stock price multiplied by the
number of outstanding shares) to drop. If it drops low enough, the
firm’s assets and cash will be worth more than the cost of taking the
firm over. This condition produces the final source of discipline for
recalcitrant firms: the hostile takeover. Theoretically, a hostile takeover happens when a new team of owners and managers takes over
the assets of a corporation by buying them at the depressed price and
using them more fruitfully in the pursuit of maximizing shareholder
value.
The shareholder perspective offered both a criticism of what
managers were doing circa 1980 and a set of prescriptions about what
ought to be done about it.54 From the point of view of these critics,
the main culprits to blame for the problems of American business in
the early 1980s were managers who had failed to maximize shareholder value in the 1970s. 55 Put simply, these managers were not
deploying the assets of firms in such a way as to earn the highest
possible rates of return. Managers were sitting on undervalued assets
that were earning low profits. Not surprisingly, stock prices reflected
the judgment of the market as to how well they were doing. These
sitting management teams were also accused of controlling their
boards of directors. 56

53. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12; Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The
Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. F IN . ECON . 5 (1983).
54. For versions of what managers “should” do that appeared in the popular business
press, see G EORGE P. B AKER & GEORGE DAVID S MITH , T HE NEW F INANCIAL C APITALISTS :
KOHLBERG K RAVIS R OBERTS AND THE C REATION OF C ORPORATE VALUE 104 (1998);
MICHAEL H AMMER & J AMES C HAMPY , R EENGINEERING THE C ORPORATION : A M ANIFESTO
FOR B USINESS R EVOLUTION 18 (HarperBusiness 2006) (1993).
55. Jensen & Ruback, supra note 53, at 18–30.
56. It was thought that CEOs would appoint “insider” board members, either other top
executives of the firm or people with whom they were friendly, who were beholden to them.
See L UCIAN B EBCHUK & J ESSE F RIED , P AY W ITHOUT P ERFORMANCE : THE UNFULFILLED
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The low stock price relative to the value of assets and cash on
hand was proof that managers had failed to maximize shareholder
value. If it was more beneficial to liquidate, rather than continue operation of, a firm, then clearly, managers were to blame. The rhetoric
of shareholder value began to seep into management practices.
Useem describes how managers either responded to demands to increase shareholder value by engaging in activities that the financial
markets valued or, alternatively, they risked becoming takeover targets.57
Maximizing shareholder value implies a balance sheet in which
return on assets is high and growing over time. This encourages
managers to financially engineer their balance sheets in order to increase the attractiveness of the firm and raise its share price. The
kind of tactics managers pursued evolved over the twenty-year period.
It is useful to review some of what we know about those tactics.
At the beginning of the 1980s, firms with lots of cash, little debt, and
low stock prices found that they were likely to be merger targets.
First, by borrowing money to pay for new companies, the firms became larger, more in debt, and less valuable as takeover targets. 58
Second, managers were told to reevaluate their product lines and sell
off certain assets. Firms needed to make sure that they were in profitable businesses and were encouraged to divest themselves of unprofitable businesses. This meant they were encouraged to refocus
their business on the things they were thought to do best, what in the
parlance become known as “core competences.”59 Firms, as a result,
sold off diversified businesses.60
Third, managers were under pressure to reduce costs by closing
facilities and laying off workers. Mergers were frequently justified in
cost-savings terms. Workers who were redundant were laid off,
product lines that were not profitable were divested, and the newly

P ROMISE OF EXECUTIVE C OMPENSATION (2006). These board members would be less likely
to question the actions of the CEO.
57. U SEEM, supra note 7, at 19.
58. Davis & Stout, supra note 48, at 613; see also Linda Brewster Stearns & Kenneth D.
Allan, Economic Behavior in Institutional Environments: The Corporate Merger Wave of the
1980s, 61 A M . S OC. R EV . 699 (1996).
59. Zorn et al., supra note 48, at 271; see also HAMMER & C HAMPY , supra note 54, at
9–33.
60. Davis, Diekmann & Tinsley, supra note 7, at 561; see Ezra W. Zuckerman, The
Categorical Imperative: Securities Analysts and the Illegitimacy Discount, 104 A M. J. S OC .
1398 (1999); Zuckerman, supra note 50, at 613.
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reorganized, more “focused” firm, would presumably make more
money.61 Eventually, managers figured out they could give a momentary boost to their stock price by announcing layoffs: a firm’s
short-term costs would decrease, which might spike the bottom line
and, therefore, increase returns on assets.
Using a field theory perspective, Davis and Thompson argue
that the financial community and managers who embraced the “maximizing shareholder value” rhetoric formed a kind of social movement. 62 The financial community used the frame of “maximizing
shareholder value” to push existing firms toward financial reorganization; where managers resisted, members of the financial community would aid others in doing hostile takeovers. Some managers resisted proponents of maximizing shareholder value. Davis shows
how managers tried to resist hostile takeovers by creating financial
devices (including so-called poison pills) to prevent such takeovers.63
Poison pills flood the market with stock of a firm in the event of a
hostile takeover bid—diluting stock and forcing those initiating the
takeover to make a higher offer.
However, the evidence shows that, overall, the pressure of the
financial community towards maximizing shareholder value resulted
in firms engaging in precisely the forms of financial reorganization
recommended by the financial community.64 In a prior paper, I provide evidence that firms who were targets of takeovers had undervalued assets relative to stock prices.65 I show that firms who engaged in
mergers, divestitures, and stock buybacks were less likely to be targets of takeover bids. I also demonstrate that having institutional
investors on the boards of directors pushed managers to engage in
financial reorganization.
Evidence shows that firms reduced the number of products they
produced by merging with firms producing similar products and divesting unrelated product lines. 66 Zorn and his colleagues demonstrate that the number of mergers involving diversification dropped
61. See Peter Cappelli, Examining the Incidence of Downsizing and Its Effect on Establishment Performance, in ON THE J OB: IS L ONG -TERM EMPLOYMENT A THING OF THE P AST ?
463 (David Neumark ed., 2000); Kevin F. Hallock, Layoffs, Top Executive Pay, and Firm
Performance, 88 AM. E CON . R EV . 711 (1998).
62. See Davis & Thompson, supra note 50.
63. See generally Gerald F. Davis, Agents Without Principles? The Spread of the Poison
Pill Through the Intercorporate Network, 36 A DMIN . S CI . Q. 583 (1991).
64. U SEEM, supra note 7, at 19–56.
65. F LIGSTEIN , ARCHITECTURE OF M ARKETS , supra note 7, at 147–69.
66. See Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, supra note 7.
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precipitously during the 1980s.67 There was a steep rise in mergers in
firms’ main product lines. There was also a substantial rise in vertical mergers (i.e., the purchase of upstream suppliers or downstream
customers). Scholars have demonstrated how these changes reoriented top managers towards institutional investors.
Within the corporation, the title “Chief Financial Officer”
(CFO) was used to describe the executive who interfaced with the
financial markets to explain how the actions of the firm were going
to raise profits and affect share price. 68 On the market side, financial
analysts who worked for large brokerage firms were the main targets
for such messages. In order to attain “buy” recommendations from
these analysts, CFOs and “Chief Executive Officers” (CEOs) needed
evidence showing strategic changes in line with increasing share
prices. Stock analysts were guiding corporations to focus their product lines so that firms’ prospects could be easily evaluated.69
Shareholder value was a historical system that entered the
American business scene during the early 1980s. The invasion of the
market for corporate control by financial institutions under the
shareholder value rubric was about the assertion of power by the
largest institutional investors over the management teams that led the
largest corporations. It involved a realignment of the relationships
between managers and financial markets, with the investors in those
markets coming to dominate the largest corporations. The rise of
agency theory-inspired, shareholder value-driven capitalism was,
first and foremost, about the rise of finance and its new powerful grip
over American corporations. This domination was achieved through
the use of a set of financial devices that were applied to the activities
of firms to measure the degree to which managers’ strategies produced increases in shareholder value, measured by various kinds of
financial statistics and, of course, the share price.
The shareholder value agenda of institutional investors successfully reorganized American society in profound ways. For example,
since 1980, the share of national income in the United States going to
capital has risen from 34% to 42%, while the share for labor has
dropped from 66% to 58%.70 At the same time, wealth and income
67. See Zorn et al., supra note 48.
68. See id.
69. See Zuckerman, supra note 60; Zuckerman, supra note 50.
70 . National Income and Product Accounts Table 1.12, B UREAU ECON . ANALYSIS ,
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1#reqid=9&step=3&isuri=1&903=53
(last visited Nov. 27, 2015) (follow “Section 1: Domestic Product and Income hyperlink; then
follow “Table 1.12. National Income by Type of Income” hyperlink).
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inequality over the period have soared. A set of recent studies show
that, at the economy, industry, and firm levels, the main source driving this redistribution of income from labor to capital has been the
shareholder value revolution.71
Field theory suggests that the new incumbents in the market for
corporate control are those who run the financial markets and those
who invest in them. Their takeover of that market and their reorienting the view of managers of publicly held corporations to focus on
raising the share price has been highly advantageous to its principal
beneficiaries. The U.S. model of how to make money in the largest
publicly held corporations has shifted dramatically in the past 150
years. 72 This suggests that one should try to understand corporate
governance not as a static set of concepts, but as a historical and cultural phenomenon that reflects the power of some actors over others
and their difference across settings.73
The historical understanding of this system means that someday
it will collapse. What will cause it to collapse is not scholars who are
critical of this institution, but, instead, a massive crisis where the
largest corporations using financial techniques fail to make profit or,
alternatively, where the interests of shareholders alter dramatically. I
note that the financial crisis of 2007–2009 was not enough to dislodge the shareholder value view of corporations. This shows that a
crisis is not enough for change. In order for there to be substantive
change, an alternative must emerge and actors who carry the banner
of that alternative must be in the position to reorganize the field. As
long as shareholder value tactics continue to work for institutional
investors, the shareholder value and agency theory perspective will
continue to dominate. But, this does not mean that those models will
not eventually transform.

71. See, e.g., Adam Goldstein, Revenge of the Managers: Labor Cost-Cutting and the
Paradoxical Resurgence of Managerialism in the Shareholder Value Era, 1984  t o 2001, 77
AM. S OC . R EV . 268 (2012); Taekjin Shin, Explaining Pay Disparities Between Top Executive
and Nonexecutive Employees: A Relative Bargaining Power Approach, 92 S OC . F ORCES 1339
(2014); Donald Tomaskovic-Devey & Ken-Hou Lin, Income Dynamics, Economic Rents, and
the Financialization of the U.S. Economy, 76 AM. S OC. R EV . 538 (2011); Thomas W.
Volscho & Nathan Kelly, The Rise of the Super-Rich: Power Resources, Taxes, Financial
Markets, and the Dynamics of the Top 1 Percent, 1949 to 2008, 77 AM . S OC . R EV . 679
(2012).
72. F LIGSTEIN , C ORPORATE C ONTROL , supra note 7, at 1–32.
73 . See R OE , supra note 14, at 3–8; MARK J. R OE , P OLITICAL D ETERMINANTS OF
C ORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003).
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CONCLUSION
The theory of fields offers a great deal of conceptual clarity to
the transformation of the field of corporate governance in the past
forty years. By focusing on who the players are, what the basis of
their power is, and how they enforce that power, we can examine the
historical process by which new conceptions of the corporation and
corporate governance emerge. This Article provides a stylized account of the emergence of the agency-based, shareholder value perspective, focusing on how the crisis of the 1970s managerial-dominated field of corporate governance produced the conditions
for a new way to organize corporate governance to emerge. The
shareholder value revolution was literally a transformation of the
relationships between managers, investors, financial markets, and
workers. This reorganization has worked greatly to the benefit of the
winners (owners of capital and CEOs) and has made things worse for
the losers (workers and everyone who earns just a salary).
Much of the literature in economics, business studies, and political science that is critical of the shareholder value model implicitly
accepts the assumption that the model, in its idealized form, is what
good corporate governance should be. For these scholars, the main
issue for corporations is remaining vigilant and ensuring these institutions constrain managers. From their perspective, it is the failure of
boards of directors to do their fiduciary oversight that allows managers to be out of control. This means that the current system encourages managers to take on too much risk because their time horizons
are short and, if they are successful, to increase their pay substantially.74
The field perspective shows why those critical of the shareholder value perspective are unlikely to have much luck in changing the
system as it exists. The investor class does not fail to benefit merely
because sometimes managers take added risks or act in their own
interests. The critique that shareholder value does not leave space for
stakeholders or provide concerns for labor and the environment, although well-intentioned, misses the very way the system works. A
society where the only actors who matter are shareholders is the one
we have in America. This allows these actors to undertake actions
that benefit only themselves and, as the sociological literature has
shown, there has been a redistribution of national income from work74. For examples of this perspective, see the analysis in B EBCHUK & F RIED , supra note
56.
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ers and lower-level managers to top managers and investors. Stakeholders cannot matter when the system is built to exploit their weaknesses.
One advantage of agency theory and the shareholder value perspective is that it offers both a positive account of the most efficient
ways to organize and a moral critique of any system that does not
conform to that vision. Field theory does not have a straightforward
normative model. It is not about a justification for a particular normative order per se. Indeed, by revealing the interests and identities
of key players in any field, field theory is more about unmasking
how things work and what holds them in place. Knowing these facts
can help scholars and critics make arguments about how such systems are not exactly what their proponents claim—the best way to
organize. But, they leave open the issue of what might be better and
more justifiable for other actors. I think field theory can be deployed
in such endeavors by appealing to how the current order is less fair
and equitable, principles that can be deployed to judge any set of
institutional arrangements.
Finally, field theory might prove useful to legal scholars who
want to have a better understanding of how particular legal arguments came to have so much power in structuring social relationships
within and across fields. I have demonstrated that agency theory and
shareholder value were historical constructs that have benefitted corporations and their owners. Legal arguments that support that takeover can be understood and perhaps attacked by trying to expose how
they were social constructions.

